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1Using Model Checking for Analyzing Distributed
Power Control Problems
Thomas Brihaye, Marc Jungers, Samson Lasaulce,
Nicolas Markey, and Ghassan Oreiby
Abstract
Model checking (MC) is a formal verification technique which has known and still knows a resounding success
in the computer science community. Realizing that the distributed power control (PC) problem can be modeled by a
timed game between a given transmitter and its environment the authors wanted to know whether this approach can
be applied to distributed PC. It turns out that it can be applied successfully and allows one to analyze realistic scenarii
including the case of discrete transmit powers and games with incomplete information. The proposed methodology is
as follows. We state some objectives a transmitter-receiver pair would like to reach. The network is modeled by a game
where transmitters are considered as timed automata interacting with each other. The objectives are then translated
into timed alternating-time temporal logic formulae and MC is exploited to know whether the desired properties are
verified and determine a winning strategy.
Index Terms
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Power control (PC) has been and is still recognized as an important technical problem in communication
networks, especially in wireless networks. With the advent of new communications concepts, such as
cognitive radio [12] and open spectrum access in unlicensed bands (see e.g., [16]), being capable of designing
PC algorithms in a distributed way has become particularly important. When inspecting the literature related
to distributed PC, a dominant methodology arises from the vast majority of existing works. The PC problem
is generally modeled by a game where the players are the transmitters, the sets of strategies are the ranges
for the transmit powers and the utility/payoff functions of the players can be for example, the transmission
rate (see e.g., [15], [8], [3]) or energy-efficiency (see e.g., [7], [11], [9]). As the terminals are assumed to
be free, selfish and rational decision-makers, one fundamental issue is to know whether there is a solution
to this conflict of interests. In the literature of PC games the most used solution concept is the Nash
equilibrium (NE). An NE corresponds to a game outcome/state effectively observed when every player does
the best for itself (rationality assumption), knows the others do so (rationality is common knowledge), and
has a complete knowledge of the game played (complete information assumption). One of the properties of
such a state is that it is stable to a single deviation, i.e., if one player deviates from the equilibrium unilaterally,
he looses in terms of utility. Therefore, a generic technical issue that is treated in works on distributed PC
is the existence issue for an NE, which amounts to proving (mathematically) the existence of a fixed point.
In this paper a different point of view is adopted. The main two differences between the existing game-
theoretic works and the work presented here is as follows. First, we make a different behavioral assumption
for the players. Each transmitter does not assume that the others do the best for themselves but rather
that they can form a coalition which can do the worst for the considered transmitter; a strategy allowing a
player to reach its objective under these conditions is called a winning strategy. For instance, this worst-case
assumption can be very relevant to engineers who want to design transmitters that have to reach a certain
quality of service independently of the design/strategy of the other transmitters/manufacturers/operators.
Second, we do not want to prove mathematically the existence of an NE or a network state having certain
properties. Rather, we formulate the PC problem as a timed game [10] between the considered pair of nodes
and its environment, and prove the existence or non-existence of such a (winning) strategy by translating the
objective into a temporal logic formula [6] and exploiting the powerful technique of model checking (MC;
see e.g., [5]). Although MC is not very well-known from the communications community, it is a concept of
paramount importance in the computer science community, as witnessed by its inventors winning the ACM
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3Turing Award in 2007. It aims at checking, automatically, exhaustively and formally (with a computer) if
a system (possibly involving several agents) verifies some properties expressed in a given logical language.
In our case, MC provides the answer to whether a certain property can be satisfied. Additionally, in the
case where it is satisfied, the model checker is able to compute a winning strategy (a PC policy in our case).
Our motivation for using model checking (computational approach) instead of proving a theorem (analytical
approach) is essentially twofold: we do not consider Nash equilibria (and therefore fixed-point solutions);
our study aims at considering the practical case where transmit powers are discrete. Concerning the latter
point, note that, as mentioned recently [14], the vast majority of works on distributed PC assume continuous
transmit powers while in many existing communications systems it can only be discrete. All results based
on compactness and convexity of the strategy sets of the players are not valid anymore. In particular, these
results include existence, uniqueness, convergence results for pure Nash equilibria in non-cooperative PC
games. Therefore, the case of discrete powers can become difficult and even impossible to solve analytically.
This paper is structured as follows. First, we describe the network model under investigation and justify
the assumptions made (Sec. II). Second, we state some properties a given transmitter-receiver pair would
like to be verified and present the strategic form of the distributed PC game viewed from a given transmitter
(Sec. III). In Sec. IV, we reformulate this game into a timed game by using the notion of timed automaton
and propose a way of modeling the timed game which is compatible with the model checker used, namely
Uppaal-TiGA [2]. In Sec. V, we translate the desired properties into formulae expressed in a given temporal
logic and use Uppaal-TiGA to know whether the network allows theses properties to be verified. At last,
in Sec. VI concluding remarks and possible extensions are provided.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Here we present the assumed signal model but it is important to keep in mind that the proposed approach
is not inherent to the assumed communication model and network topology, and can be directly applied
to other models just by changing the expressions of the different signal-to-interference plus noise ratios
(SINRs). In this paper, we assume an interference channel [4] with K transmitter-receiver pairs (Txi,Rxi),
i ∈ {1, ..., K}, as described in Fig. 1. The baseband signal received by Rxi, can be expressed by:
yi(t) =
K∑
j=1
hjixj(t) + zi(t) (1)
where ∀(i, j) ∈ {1, ..., K}2, hji represents the channel gain of the link between nodes j and i; xj(t) represents
the signal transmitted by Txj and is assumed to belong to a finite alphabet (an element of this alphabet
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4is called a symbol e.g., a quadrature amplitude modulation symbol), t being a time index associated with
a certain rate at which the medium is used (symbol index, channel use index); zi(t) is the additive white
complex noise at receiver i, zi is assumed to be distributed according to a zero-mean Gaussian random
variable with variance σ2i . As we analyze a PC problem, we make the same assumptions as in the related
works ([7], [11], etc.), that is, the channel gains are assumed to be constant over the whole duration of the
transmission but can be updated on a block-by-block basis; note that a block is defined as a sequence of N
consecutive symbols which comprises a training sequence that is, a certain number of consecutive symbols
used to estimate the channel, the SINR, etc. Usually, the PC problem consists in updating the power of a
given transmitter every block duration. Here, with more generality, we assume that it can be updated within
a block duration. We will therefore assume a block can be seen as N
n
consecutive sub-blocks of n symbols
each and use a time index τ to indicate when, in a given block, the transmit power of a given transmitter is
updated. Using this time or sub-block index, one can define within a given block the instantaneous SINR
for receiver i as follows:
∀τ ∈
{
1, ...,
N
n
}
, SINRi(τ) =
|hii|
2pi(τ)
σ2i +
∑
j 6=i |hji|
2pj(τ)
(2)
with
pi(τ) =
1
n
n∑
t′=1
|x(t′)|2, (3)
which means that the instantaneous power results from averaging the power over n consecutive symbols.
The vector (p1(τ), ..., pK(τ)) will be called the network state for sub-block τ . We will call the time elapsed
during n symbol durations a time unit (TU). In addition to the assumptions made so far we will suppose that:
• Assumption 1. The transmit power of each transmitter i ∈ {1, ..., K} is discrete, pi(τ)[dBm] ∈ Pi,
Pi = {P0, P0 +∆P, ..., P0 + (M − 1)∆P}, and can be increased or decreased by at most one power
increment ∆P every TU; w.l.o.g. M is assumed to be an odd integer.
• Assumption 2. Every arriving user starts transmitting at the power pi(t = 0)[dBm] = Pwu = P0 +
M−1
2
∆P (“wu” stands for wake up).
• Assumption 3. Each transmitter can start/stop transmitting at any time but has to remain at the ON or
OFF state during a minimum amount of time tON or tOFF.
• Assumption 4. Each transmitter (say i) knows its SINR and (hji)j perfectly.
• Assumption 5. There is a maximum SINR, denoted by γmax, above which no transmitter is allowed to
operate.
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5• Assumption 6. Each receiver Rxi knows the channel gain hii only.
• Assumption 7. The number of transmitters, i.e., K can possibly vary at any time, which means in
particular that they can be asynchronous (to the best to the authors’ knowledge the models currently
available in the literature of distributed PC problems cannot account for this feature).
Let us give some motivations for these assumptions. First, concerning Assumption 1, note that the transmit
power cannot vary arbitrarily over time, it can only be increased or decreased by one power step every
TU. This might translate some physical limitations due to the transmitter (e.g., because of the finite power
amplifier slew rate). In fact, for the model checker we exploit in Sec. V, this assumption allows for a
dramatic reduction of complexity for the verification procedure. To conclude with Assumption 1, note that
the discrete power assumption ensures the existence of a mixed NE in strategic-form non-cooperative PC
games with complete information and rational users. In this paper we do not want to exploit this result for
at least three reasons: it is demanding in terms of information assumptions; we do not focus on the case of
network states having the NE property (namely there are stable to a single deviation) but look at states which
can have different properties; mixed strategies are not always relevant in communication networks (e.g., for
short transmissions, sporadic traffic with non-stationary network parameters). Note that [14] also addressed
the case of discrete powers but the goal in [14] is to study the existence and convergence issues towards a
pure or mixed NE by exploiting stochastic learning algorithm. Assumption 2 is arbitrary but reasonable if the
environment is unknown before starting the transmission. Assumption 3 accounts for possible constraints
from the network or used technology. Assumption 4 is realistic in terms of knowledge since in many
communications systems, there is a feedback mechanism allowing the transmitter to be informed with the
SINR. This information assumption is also not very strong in comparison to the usual assumptions generally
needed to analyze Nash equilibria in PC games, especially games with complete information. Assumption 5
indicates the existence of a constraint on the SINR for every transmitter. For instance, this constraint can
be imposed by a regulator or follow from an agreement between operators/manufacturers. Note that this
constraint is different from the one on the maximum transmit power. It can be stronger in fact. Indeed,
if a transmitter, say i, is very close to its access point, it can happen that transmitting at full power,
i.e., pi[dBm] = Pmax[dBm] = P0+(M−1)∆P does not meet the condition SINRi ≤ SINRmax. Assumption 6
is a standard assumption, which is necessary to ensure coherent communications. Assumption 7 indicates
that the proposed approach applies to networks where transmitters are asynchronous and can enter/leave the
network at any time. This is a consequence of our information assumptions: the individual SINR can be
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6known without knowing the instantaneous number of active transmitters and the worst case assumption only
requires the knowledge of the maximum transmitters with which a transmitter can interact (this number is
necessarily limited in wireless networks because of path loss effects and limited user density). At last, the
fact that the arrival/departure instant of a transmitter is not a multiple of the sub-block duration is known
to be a negligible effect in real wireless networks, which is what is assumed here.
Txk
Rxk
Tx2
Rx2
Tx1
Rx1
h11
h12
h21
h22 hkk
· · ·
· · ·
Fig. 1. Assumed communication model: a K-user interference channel.
III. PROPOSED NETWORK PROPERTIES AND POWER CONTROL GAME DEFINITION
Our ultimate objective is to know if, in the network described in the preceding section, every transmitter
is satisfied. A transmitter will be said to be satisfied if he can exchange a certain volume of data and at
the same time reach a transmission quality target. In fact, we assume that every transmitter wants to reach
this objective independently of what the other transmitters do. As a consequence of this, the network can
be seen from the point of view of a given transmitter, say i, as a game between itself and its environment.
The environment includes the other transmitters and the channel. The channel consists of the matrix H
whose entries are the channel gains hij. It is fixed for a given block of data. Therefore, transmitter i will
be satisfied if there exists a winning strategy in the game between itself and its environment, that is, the
desired properties will be verified whatever the environment does. The existence of such a winning strategy
will be proven in Sec. V by using the Uppaal-TiGA model checker. We consider the following properties.
Let ∆τ and tout be two durations expressed in TUs and γmin, γ− be two SINR thresholds with γmin ≥ γ−.
• Property 3. The network satisfies Property 3 for player i if the following three relations are verified:
∃τ i, ∀τ ∈ {τ i, τ i + 1, ..., τ i +∆τ} , ∀p−i(τ) ∈ P˜−i, SINRi(τ) ≥ γmin; (4)
[
∃(τ0, τ−), ∀τ ∈ {τ0, τ0 + 1, ..., τ0 + τ−}, γ− ≤ SINRi(τ) ≤ γmin
]
⇒ τ− ≤ tout; (5)
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7∀τ ∈
{
1, ...,
N
n
}
, SINRi(τ) ≥ γ−. (6)
• Property 2. The network satisfies Property 2 for player i if Property 3 is satisfied in the special case
γmin = γ− or equivalently if tout = 0.
• Property 1. The network satisfies Property 1 for player i if Property 2 is satisfied in the special case
∆τ = 0 i.e., the target SINR γmin can be reached during at least for one sub-block index (namely τ i).
In (4), p−i(τ) is the (K − 1)-uplet (p1(τ), . . . , pi−1(τ), pi+1(τ), . . . , pK(τ)). This (K − 1)-dimensional
vector lies in general in the product space P1 × · · · × Pi−1 × Pi+1 · · · × PK . But here, we have used the
notation P˜−i to clearly indicate that we assume that the PC policy implemented by every transmitter cannot
be arbitrary but has to verify Assumption 5:
P˜i = {pi ∈ Pi, SINRi ≤ γmax} . (7)
We therefore see that, for a fixed channel, transmitter i assumes the worst case in terms of environment,
that is, in terms of behavior for the other transmitters. Said otherwise, a given transmitter is free to do what
is best for itself but assumes that the other transmitters can form a coalition aiming at decreasing its chances
to reach its objective. The drawback for this assumption is that the obtained results will be pessimistic and
the desired property will be met more often than expected. But, we have to keep in mind that one of our
goals was to relax the rationality assumption (every transmitter does the best for itself and this is common
knowledge to every transmitter). We can see that in the proposed framework it is effectively not needed.
This framework can be very useful in some scenarii. For example, it can happen that, over a certain period
of time, Tx2 wants to maximize its transmission rate (high speed uploading) while later on, for a second
phase, it wants to save its energy. From the point of view of Tx1 , assuming that it always wants to save
its energy, Tx2 will not behave rationally over the first phase. In brief, the rationality assumption can be
very questionable, especially in heterogeneous networks (with different manufacturers, operators, services,
technologies, etc.). Therefore if Property q ∈ {1, 2, 3} is verified for transmitter i, it means that the latter
can reach its objective in the worst environment.
Now, let us comment the proposed properties separately. Property 1 allows a transmitter to be sure that for
a fixed channel state, there will be a moment at which the packet it wants to send can be received reliably,
independently of the power dynamics of the other transmitters. This occurs when a short message has to be
transmitted. Property 2 allows, this time, the transmitter to be ensured to transmit a certain volume of data
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8(D×∆τ bits where D is the data rate in bit/s) reliably within a time interval equals to the channel coherence
time, i.e., the interval over which the channel state can be considered to be fixed. As tout = 0, the property
also imposes that connectivity is never lost. Property 3, like Property 2, guarantees that a certain volume
of data can be exchanged reliably but is more tolerant than Property 2. Indeed, it allows the receiver to
operate below the minimum required SINR for ensuring a certain transmission quality target for a certain
duration (tout TUs). For example, this allows one to account for interesting scenarii such as the case where
a new transmitter enters the network. When a new user arrives, it can happen that the minimum SINR target
of player i, i.e., γmin is not met for a short interval only and operating at a lower SINR γ− can suffice to
maintain connectivity. We will comment more on this scenario below. Another scenario where considering
this property is relevant is an application or a service where two levels of quality are admitted for the
transmission. To conclude on Property 3 we make some comments on the physical feasibility of such a
property: (4) translates the existence of a time windows over which the medium is sufficiently good, which
happens e.g., when the link hii is good enough or some transmitters stop emitting or the other transmitters
are far enough from transmitter i; (5) translates the non-existence of a too wide windows over which the
channel conditions are bad in the sense that the system is not robust to a network change over this time
windows; (6) ensures that over the whole block or packet duration connectivity is not lost.
Here, we justify in a more detailed manner why we use two SINR thresholds (namely γmin and γ−) instead
of one as it is usually the case for the standard formulation of the PC problem (see e.g., [13]). Indeed,
in [13] and related papers the goal is to minimize the transmit power under the constraint SINRi ≥ γ− with
tout → +∞; this policy allows one to reach the minimum transmission quality target and save energy. Here,
by allowing the SINR target to be different from the minimum SINR target we ensure a certain degree
of robustness against networks changes like the arrival of a new user. Therefore the value of γ− has to
be chosen in accordance with desired robustness degree. To be more concrete, let us consider an example.
Assume a network comprising 2 pairs of nodes at time τ and 3 pairs of nodes at time τ+1 and the existence
of a steady state for the network with two users, that is, pi(τ) = pi. Without loss of generality, consider
transmitter 1. Under typical assumptions, the probability that SINR1 at time τ +1 is less than γ− given that
it equals γmin at time τ can be checked to be (see Appendix A):
Pr
[
SINR1(τ + 1) ≤ γ−
∣∣∣SINR1(τ) = γmin] = Pr
[
|h31|
2 ≥ α
(
γmin
γ−
− 1
)]
(8)
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9where α = σ
2
1+|h21|
2p2
Pwu
. Additionally, if |h31|2 is exponentially distributed (case of Rayleigh fading) we have
that the probability of loosing connectivity (outage probability), which we call Pout, is given by:
Pout = exp
[
−
σ21 + |h21|
2p2
Pwu
(
γmin
γ−
− 1
)]
. (9)
Therefore by fixing a desired target for Pout we find the appropriate value for γmin to be used in the PC
algorithm. As a consequence, for a given channel state Properties 1–3 will be verified or not but γmin allows
one to tune the probability of verifying the latter. The price to be paid for a certain robustness against the
arrival of a new user is a higher energy consumption w.r.t. the standard assumption γmin = γ−.
At this point we have all the elements to define the PC game under investigation properly. As already
mentioned, the game has to be defined from a given transmitter’s point of view. Consider transmitter i.
⋆ Players. There are two players in the game. Transmitter i is the first player (protagonist) and the rest of
the transmitters (−i) constitutes the second player (antagonist).
⋆ Strategies. A pure strategy for transmitter i consists of a sequence of causal functions (pτi )τ∈{1,...,Nn } with
pτi : H
(τ) → P˜i
(pi(1), ..., pi(τ − 1)) 7→ pi(τ)
(10)
where H(τ) is the set of possible game histories H(τ) ⊂ P˜τi ⊂ [0, Pmax]τ that is, verifying Assumptions 1 to 7.
Note that the choice of these functions does not depend on a particular action (vector of transmit powers)
of the opponent (called a move in game theory) but only depends on the knowledge of the considered
transmitter on the game. In particular, it depends on what he believes on its opponent and its objective.
⋆ Utilities. If a given Property is satisfied (resp. not satisfied) for transmitter i, transmitter i gets +1 (resp. −1)
and the environment −i (i.e., the antagonist) gets −1 (resp. +1). If a player has several winning strategies
(providing him with +1), he chooses the one minimizing the consumed energy or equivalently the quantity∑N
t=0 |xi(t)|
2
.
Proving the existence of a winning strategy for player i in the stated zero-sum game appears to be non-
trivial. We note that one of the problems here is the dynamic aspect of the game, which is not present in the
conventional approach of the distributed PC problem (e.g., [13]). Indeed, the other transmitters can start/stop
emitting whenever they want to and also choose any feasible sequence of actions (pi(τ))τ . Additionally the
game is with incomplete information since a transmitter (say i) does not know all the game; for instance the
channel gains of the others are not known (hjk, k 6= i). A possible way of tackling the considered problem
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is to reformulate the game as a timed game, for which MC can be applied. This is the purpose of the next
section.
IV. TRANSLATING THE DISTRIBUTED PC PROBLEM INTO A TIMED GAME
We have presented the assumed network model in Sec. II and the properties we would like it to verify
in Sec. III. In order to know whether these properties are verified or not we want to exploit the concept of
MC and more specifically the Uppaal-TiGA model checker, which is the purpose of Sec. V. To this end,
we need to translate the network model into a timed automaton model, and express the desired properties
in a formal language named TATL (for timed alternating-time temporal logic). This is done in Sec. IV-B.
In order to make this paper sufficiently self-contained and the corresponding methodology applicable to
other communication scenarii, we first review, in Sec. IV-A, some important notions on timed automata [1]
and timed games [10]. More details are provided in Appendices B and C.
A. Review of basic notions
a) Timed automata: Roughly speaking, a timed automaton is a finite automaton enriched with clocks,
which are real-valued variables used to measure the time elapsed between different events of the automaton.
All clocks evolve at the same rate, but their values can be reset when firing transitions. The values of
the clocks can be used to enable or disable some of the transitions. A state (or configuration) of a timed
automaton is a pair (ℓ, v) where ℓ is a location of the timed automaton and v is a valuation assigning to
each clock of the automaton its nonnegative real value. There are two types of moves in timed automata:
• Delay transitions: they consist in staying at the same location and letting time elapse. The automaton
then goes from some configuration (ℓ, v) to another configuration (ℓ, v+t), where t ∈ R+ and v+t : x 7→
v(x) + t (all the clocks evolve at the same rate).
• Discrete transitions: they consist in firing a transition of the timed automaton. A transition ℓ g;a;r−−→ ℓ′
of the timed automaton comprises the following elements:
– the source and target locations ℓ and ℓ′;
– a guard g, which is a constraint on clocks (for instance, “x ≥ 1”, requiring that clock x must have
a value greater than or equal to 1 for being allowed to fire this transition);
– a label a on the transition, representing the corresponding event;
– the set r of clocks to be reset (e.g., “x := 0”);
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Firing this transition from a state (ℓ, v) is only allowed if the guard is satisfied. We then switch to
state (ℓ′, v′), with v′(x) = 0 if x ∈ r, and v′(x) = v(x) otherwise.
Timed automata are thus a finite representation of an infinite-state automaton. Still, the underlying infinite-
state automaton is quite “regular”, and this regularity allows one to have several problems decidable (for
instance, “is there an execution of the automaton reaching a given state?” (reachability) or “do all executions
avoid a given bad state?” (safety)). The algorithms generally rely on a finite-state automaton, called the
region automaton [1], which roughly exhibits the same behaviors as the infinite-state automaton it abstracts.
More precise definitions for timed automata are provided in Appendix B.
b) Timed games: Timed games [10] are timed automata in which some transitions can be uncontrollable,
in the sense that a player cannot neither prevent them from occurring nor force them to occur. In this setting,
a given state is said to be reachable if there exists a strategy which, if consistently applied, and whichever
uncontrollable transitions are applied, ensures that the goal state will be reached. In order to illustrate these
notions let us consider a simple example of timed game. Consider a transmission game with two players
(the transmitters). Assume that each transmitter has two possible actions: either transmit at full power
(called High mode) or at low power (called Low mode). The transmission constraints are as follows. The
transmitter has to stay for a minimum amount of time in each mode, and cannot stay there forever: precisely,
transmitter i has to stay between mLi and MLi (resp. mHi and MHi) TUs in the Low (resp. High) mode.
We also assume the existence of a state for which the system (or network) is blocked if both transmitters
stay at the same time in the High mode for too long, say T TUs; the clock associated with the overall
system or network will be denoted by y. Does a given user have a way of controlling its power in order
to ensure that the network will not reach the blocking state, whatever the other transmitter will do? This
situation can be modeled by a timed game (see Fig. 2 where some choices for the values for the guards
and invariants have been made. Locations ℓ0 to ℓ3 model the different modes of the two transmitters and
location ℓ4 is the blocking location. We have considered the point of view of transmitter 1. We see that user 1
acts as a controller (playing with solid transitions) and the second user acts as the environment (controlling
dashed transitions). One can show that the controller has no strategy to avoid reaching the blocking location
ℓ4. Even in this simple example, the non-existence problem of a winning strategy is not trivial. The more
general problem of PC is more complex than this problem, which is one of the reasons why automated
techniques (such as MC) are used to answer this type of questions. For the interested reader more precise
definitions for timed games are provided in Appendix C.
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ℓ0
L1,L2
x1≤200,x2≤100
ℓ1
H1,L2
x1≤50,x2≤100
ℓ2
L1,H2
x1≤200,x2≤20
ℓ3
H1,H2
x1≤50,x2≤20
c,x1≥10
x1:=0
c,x1≥10
x1:=0
c,x1≥10
x1,y:=0
c,x1≥10
x1:=0
u,x2≥15
x2:=0
u,x2≥5
x2:=0
u,x2≥15
x2,y:=0
u,x2≥5
x2:=0
ℓ4
Block
y≥9
Fig. 2. Timed game example: each xi is the clock for player i; (mL1 , ML1 , mH1 , MH1) = (10, 200, 10, 50) and (mL2 , ML2 , mH2 , MH2) =
(15, 100, 5, 20); y is the clock for the network; T = 9.
B. Timed power control game modeling
In this section, we propose a model for the general PC game presented in Sec. II, taking into account
the specificities of the model checker Uppaal-TiGA. We proceed in three steps. With each of the first two
steps a figure representing the timed automaton effectively implemented is associated. In the first and second
steps, for clarity, we restrict our attention to the case of two transmitter-receiver pairs.
c) Step 1: Fig. 3 represents our model of a transmitter. Each transmitter has its own two clocks,
denoted by x and y, and can be either ON or OFF. Clock y is used to force the transmitter to stay at
least tON (resp. tOFF) TUs in the ON (resp. OFF) state. In the figure, which corresponds to the exact
model implemented in Uppaal-TiGA, the quantities tON and tOFF are renamed ondelay and offdelay, and
switching between ON and OFF is represented by the three-state loop in the upper part of Fig. 3. Let us
comment the other three loops. The one on the left represents the transmitter increasing its power. This can
only happen if enough time has elapsed since the last change (i.e., if x ≥ delay where delay is some
positive amount of time) and if the floor SINR target is not reached yet (this last condition is encoded by the
constraint A0p1 < m1(B0 + C0 · p2), where A0, B0, C0 and m1 are chosen so that this equation represents
the required condition on the SINR). The loop on the right is the opposite case, which corresponds to the
situation where the transmitter decreases its power. The loop in the middle, represented by a dashed transition,
is uncontrollable for the transmitter: the transmitter cannot prevent this transition from occuring (as soon
as the guards are true). As a consequence, any winning strategy for the transmitter must in particular be
able to handle with the case where this transition is fired. This is a “coding trick” we use to model the fact
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that the transmitter has to decrease its power when it is too high, in the sense that it forces the transmitter
to take this case into account: the transmitter has a winning strategy only if the latter is able to handle
with the case where this transition is fired as soon as it is enabled. In a real communication system, the
constraint SINRi ≤ γmax could be imposed to the transmitter (even if it is a free decision maker) e.g., by a
regulator or the receiver itself (if the latter breaks the communication). Finally, let us stress on the fact that
the transmitter depicted on Fig. 3 will “play” against a similar opponent that is, having similar constraints
for increasing or decreasing its power but implementing any feasible PC policies.
On
Off
pi=0
pi≤Pmax
x:=0
y:=0
pi:=Pwu
decrease(p1)
x:=0
x≥delay ∧
pi>0 ∧
A0p1>M1·(B0+C0p2)∧
A0(p1−1)>m1·(B0+C0p2)
increase(p1)
x:=0
x≥delay ∧
pi<Pmax ∧
A0p1<m1·(B0+C0p2)
decrease(p1)x:=0
x≥delay ∧ pi>0 ∧
A0p1>M1·(B0+C0p2)
y≥ondelay
y:=0
pi:=0
y≥offdelay
Fig. 3. Our model of a transmitter. Equations in blue are guards of the closest transition, while updates are in green.
d) Step 2: An important feature we want the network to have is that the communication is broken if
the SINR goes below a certain threshold. The objective of transmitter 1 will be to establish and maintain a
communication on this network. To easily represent this objective, we add an observer automaton (observer
here means that it plays no role in the evolution of the system, but changes states according to the values
of the SINR. There is only one copy of this automaton in our system, which is used to keep track of
whether transmitter 1 manages to establish and maintain a communication). This is what Fig. 4 represents.
This automaton has three states. State Emit represent the target state of transmitter 1, where it can emit
with an SINR larger than γmin. Thus, player 1 can go to this state if the SINR is high enough, encoded by
the condition A0p1 ≥ H(B0 + C0p2). Then, state Emit2 is a degraded operating mode, in which the SINR
can be below a given threshold (γ−). Again, we make the transition to Emit2 uncontrollable to “force” the
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system to go to this state when the guard holds true. Two cases can occur in Emit2: either the transmitter
manages to have its SINR back to a reasonable value, in which case it will be allowed to go back to the
Emit state; or it does not manage to do so within timeout TUs (corresponding to tout), in which case the
system will be taken to the Stop state, representing the fact that the connection is broken.
Stop Emit
Emit2
A0p1≥H(B0+C0p2) y:=0
A0p1<L(B0+C0p2)
z:=0
z≥timeout
A0p1≥L(B0+C0p2)
Fig. 4. The observer implementing whether or not the connection can be established or maintained
e) Step 3: In order to model a system with more than two transmitter-receiver pairs, the only things
to be changed in steps 1 and 2 are the expressions of the SINRs and the corresponding constraints. For
example the condition from Emit to Emit2 in the observer becomes A0p1 < m1(B0 +
∑
i6=1 C
i
0pi).
V. MODEL CHECKING AND UPPAAL-TIGA
Now we have translated the PC problem under investigation into a timed game, we will check if the
corresponding game satisfies the required properties, which will be expressed as temporal logic formulas.
In order to make this paper self-contained, we first briefly review the concept of MC. Then, as the last
step of our methodology we express the desired properties in TATL and use Uppaal-TiGA to check these
properties are verified by the timed game modeling the network of interest.
A. Model checking
Formal verification is a field of computer science where the aim is to check that the behavior of an
automated system satisfies some given properties. It relies on a mathematical basis, involving logical
reasoning. Model checking is one of the existing formal-verification techniques: in this setting, the considered
automated system is modeled by a finite-state automaton (or by exploiting a related formalism, depending
on the properties under consideration). Model checking aims at automatically and exhaustively verifying that
all the executions of this automaton satisfies the properties we want to check for the original system. Those
properties can be expressed in various ways: basic properties such as reachability or safety can be checked,
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but richer properties can be handled thanks to temporal logics. Those logics extend classical propositional
logics with temporal modalities. For instance, ♦Goal expresses that “eventually, property Goal will hold
true”, and ¬Error expresses that “always (in the future), Error will not hold” (i.e., an error will
never occur). Combining them, we can write (Request⇒ ♦Grant) for expressing that any request is
eventually granted. Original model-checking algorithms have been developed to handle timed automata and
quantitative properties, such as “every request is granted within 10 time units”. Temporal logics have been
extended accordingly, so that the above property can be written (Request⇒ ♦≤10Grant). They have
also been extended to deal with open systems (games and timed games). In this setting, MC aims at verifying
controllability properties: “does there exist a strategy for restricting the behavior of the system in order to
enforce the given property”. Temporal logics have been extended in order to express this kind of properties.
In the following, we use the Uppaal-TiGA model-checker, which is a model-checker for timed control-
lability properties. The three properties stated in Sec. III are then encoded by the following three temporal
logic formulae (we use the syntax of Uppaal-TiGA here):
control : A <> (Observer.Emit)
control : A <> (Observer.Emit && Observer.y > ∆τ)
control : A[]((Observer.Emit ||Observer.Emit2)||
Observer.y ≤ ∆τ)
The first sentence means that there is a strategy (control) under which all executions (A) even-
tually reach (<>) location Observer.Emit. The second sentence expresses that there is a strategy
to make the system reach location Observer.Emit and stay there for at least ∆τ time units there
(because clock Observer.y is reset when we enter this location, so that being in Observer.Emit with
Observer.Emit > ∆τ is equivalent to staying in that location for ∆τ time units). Finally, the third
statement requires the existence of a strategy whose outcomes satisfy the following property: it is always
([]) true that the observer is either in Emit of Emit2, except possibly at the very beginning, when y is
small enough. This precisely encodes Property 3.
B. Verification results obtained by using Uppaal-TiGA
We now provide some results we have obtained when running the Uppaal-TiGA model-checker for our
models and the properties we are interested in. All the quantities used (reals) by Uppaal-TiGA have been
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approximated by rationals having 8 significant numbers. We have assumed a scenario with two transmitter-
receiver pairs. Fig. 5 represents the topology of the network considered. We assume that three terminals have
fixed positions and one terminal can move. Depending on the location of the mobile terminal (e.g., a laptop),
the channel gains hij have different values and the question is precisely to know if the three properties stated
in Sec. III are verified in a given point. The channel gains are assumed to follow the following path loss
model:
|hij |
2 = β

 d0√
d2ij + h
2


λ
(11)
where β = 0.01, d0 is a reference distance taken to be equal to 0.1 m, dij the distance between nodes i and j
and λ the path loss exponent, taken to be equal to 3. The distance h = 0.5 m is used to avoid the divergence
of the path loss in dij = 0. The transmit power of Txi is such that Pi[dBm] ∈ {11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29}.
The noise power σ2i is −90 dBm. Also γ−[dB] = 5, γmin[dB] = 10 and γmax[dB] = 13.
Fig. 5. Assumed scenario. The network comprises one mobile laptop (Tx1), one fixed computer (Tx2) and two fixed access points (Rx1) and
(Rx2).
As mentioned just above only Tx1 can move. Its coordinates (in meters) are denoted by (a, b) with
a = i ∗ ∆a, b = j ∗ ∆b, so that (a, b) = (5, 10) if Tx1 and Tx2 are co-located, (a, b) = (10, 5) if Tx1
and Rx1 are co-located, etc.. With these conventions, the distance between Tx1 and Rx1 expresses as
d211 = (10− a)
2 + (5− b)2. With the set of all possible positions for Tx1 one can associate an image which
is labeled by I(i,q) and defined as follows: a white pixel indicates that Property q ∈ {1, 2, 3} is satisfied for
transmitter i ∈ {1, 2} at the considered point, a gray pixel indicates that Property q is not satisfied at the
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considered point and a black pixel indicates the positions of the fixed terminals. Here are some results we
obtained by using Uppaal-TiGA.
Fig. 6. I(1,3): verification of Property 3 for transmitter 1 with (∆a,∆b) = (0.125 m, 0.125 m).
f) Image I(1,3): Here we consider a simple scenario, which allows us to validate the model implemented
with Uppaal-TiGA. Fig. 6 shows the area in which Property 3 is satisfied for transmitter 1 for ∆t = 1 TUs,
tout = 3 TUs, tON = 5 TUs, tOFF = 5 TUs. This area is a disk centered in the position of receiver 1, which
can be explained by a simple calculation on the path loss effect. What is more surprising is the presence of
the gray ring, which shows that connectivity can be lost as d11 increases and then recovered while d11 still
increases. This non-trivial effect has been observed in many other scenarii. Our interpretation is that this
effect is due to the discrete nature of the transmit power. Uppaal-TiGA allowed us to partly confirm this
interpretation. Indeed, Uppaal-TiGA allows us to synthesize the corresponding strategies and play against
it: we could not explore all possible plays, but the existence of the ring appearing in the figure seems to
be linked to the fact that the transmitter has to decrease its power one more time by when moving from
the closest inner adjacent white circle to the gray ring. Fig. 7 shows a zoom on a part of this area when
the power increment is 1 dBm (instead of 3 dBm in the case of Fig. 6). The results provided here are
useful not only because they can help assessing the coverage area of a receiver (important for an operator
or network owner) but also because they show the importance of having a transmit power quantized more
accurately for the highest values. Indeed, using different quantization steps (non-uniform quantization) for
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the transmit power (always in dB) should help removing the intermediate dead zones appearing in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7. I(1,3): showing the influence of the discrete nature of transmit power on connectivity between Tx1 and Rx1 in the sense of Property 3;
(∆a,∆b) = (0.0625 m, 0.0625 m).
g) Image I(2,1): This time we consider the point of view of transmitter 2 vis-a-vis the position of
transmitter 1, where the noise power σ2i is −92.2 dBm. Not surprisingly Fig. 8 shows that when transmitter
1 is too close to receiver 2 Property 1 cannot be verified for transmitter 2. This explains the gray area and
the white area on the left. Here again, an a priori non-trivial effect appears. There is a small white area
mixed with the gray area in which Property 1 is true. Our interpretation is as follows. When Tx1 is close
to Rx1, Tx1 becomes less aggressive in terms of transmit power since its objective can be easily reached,
which means that Rx2 receives less interference. But only half of the “disk” is white because in the other
half, Tx1 seems to be too close to Rx2 to allow Tx2 and Rx2 to be connected. The existence of such an
area is interesting since it shows that designing sensing algorithms based on the distance only can have
undesirable effects. Indeed, if Tx2 implements such an algorithm based on the distance between itself and
Tx1, it appears that the influence of Tx1 is stronger when it is close to Rx1 than what it is when it is close to
Tx2. This shows the type of implications of our results in terms of design. Note that this type of algorithms
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is implictly assumed in the wireless game theory literature using best-response or learning-type algorithms.
Finally, Fig. 9 shows how players interact with each other by choosing their transmit power over time.
In this example, transmitter Tx1 tries to establish and maintain a communication with its receiver Rx1, while
Tx2 initiates short communications. In this example, Tx2 is rather far from its receiver, so that it is allowed
to turn its power to its maximal value. In order to maintain the communication, Tx1 also has to increase
its power. This goes smoothly for the first communication initiated by Tx2, but communication of Tx1 is
broken at the second time, because Tx1, that is close to its receiver, had set its power to its minimal value
and could not “react” in time to set its SINR back to a reasonable value. This both illustrates the sequence of
actions associated with the winning strategies of the transmitters and shows that the proposed setup allows
one to accomodate asynchronous transmitters.
Fig. 8. I(2,1): Influence of the position of Tx1 on connectivity between Tx2 and Rx2 in the sense of Property 1.
C. Towards an implementable distributed power control algorithm
A natural and relevant issue is to assess the gap between the power control procedure and an algorithm
implementable in a real terminal (a laptop, a mobile phone, a robot, a sensor, etc). Here we do not pretend
that the proposed procedure is ready to be implemented in a real terminal but we still want to provide
some elements towards reaching this objective. Consider transmitter i. There are two steps. The first step is
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P (dBm)
0
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14
17
23
26
29
Pwu = 20
time
Emit
Emit2
Stop
Tx2
Tx1
Fig. 9. Transmit power versus time for the two users.
performed off-line by a computation center (which can be different from the transmitter but not necessarily).
The second one is always performed on-line at the transmitter.
First step. Define a off-line function for which the output is
• either a positive answer (yes or 1) associated with a non-zero sequence of functions (as defined in (10)),
• or a negative answer (no or 0) associated with the zero sequence (connection failure)
and the inputs are the (quantized) channel gains (|hij|)j 6=i), the (quantized) noise level σ2i , the maximum
number of transmitters Kmax (already discrete), the sets of transmit powers Pj , j ∈ {1, ..., Kmax (already
discrete), and Fq the logic formulae (written with the syntax of Uppaal-TiGA), where q ∈ {1, 2, ..., Q}
is the formula index (Q = 3 in our case), translating the properties to be verified. For every possible
5−tuple
(
(|hij|)j , σ
2
i , Kmax, (Pj)j , (Fq)q
)
the model checker is used to provide the value of the output of
the function. The corresponding lookup table is stored in the transmitter memory.
Second step. Define an on-line function for which the output is a sequence of functions and the inputs
are the channel gains (|hij |)j 6=i. Every block duration, this function is runned (processing) and the look-up
table (memory) gives the terminal the sequence of power control functions to be used (see (10)). Within a
block, the transmitter plays its actions (transmit power levels) according to this sequence of functions.
VI. SUMMARIZING AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In comparison with existing works on distributed power control we have made two key choices, leading to
a different methodology to analyze the problem. Instead of assuming that every transmitter does what is best
for itself we assume that, from a given transmitter point of view, the other transmitter can form a coalition
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aiming at choosing the worst environment for the considered transmitter. This worst-case assumption allows
one to cope with some assumptions on the behavior of the other transmitters, which can be invalid in certain
scenarii like in heterogeneous networks or when transmitters does not act rationally. Although pessimistic, it
also allows the engineer to design a transmitter-receiver pair able to operate successfully under any feasible
network configuration. The second important choice made in this paper is that the existence of the desired
network state (namely verifying some properties for each transmitter) is not proven mathematically as it
usually the case for Nash equilibria; one of the motivations for this is that this problem was non-trivial
especially because we have considered the practical assumption of discrete transmit-power and consider the
dynamic aspect of the problem. Rather, we propose another approach. This approach consists in modeling
the problem as a timed game between a given transmitter and its environment and ask a model checker
for a rigorous answer to whether or not there exists a winning strategy (in the sense of certain desired
properties for this player). Note that model checkers not only provide the answer to this question but also a
winning strategy when it exists. In a concrete manner, this shows that it is possible to implement a certain
mapping between a set of possible channel states and a set of winning strategies. At last, we have illustrated
our approach by exploiting the Uppaal-TiGA model checker and shown how non-trivial verification results
could be obtained.
In view of the obtained results, the proposed approach is quite general and seems to be promising. By
general, we mean that it only applies to interference channels but also to any multiuser channels. Of course,
the authors made some assumptions which can be discussed, which opens the possibility of extending the
present work. For example, in addition to the extensions proposed above: (a) One could try to remove the
assumption of the worst behavior assumption for the environment. Indeed the price to be paid for removing
the rationality assumption is that the influence of the other transmitters is overestimated. In a non-cooperative
network, the transmitters will not always be able to form a coalition to fight against a given transmitter. In
particular, this means that if the Nash equilibrium is effectively the most appropriate solution concept, the
proposed approach can be adapted to prove the existence and uniqueness of an NE when proving a fixed-
point theorem leads to a failure. The extension of our work to the Nash equilibrium solution concept would
be an interesting and non-trivial extension since the protagonist-antagonist approach used in Uppaal-TiGA
does not hold anymore;(b) The framework of time games allows one to deal with real-time applications
while we have focused here on the case of delay-tolerant applications; (c) Since one can treat the case of
dynamic games, it would be very interesting to compare the utilities obtained by Uppaal-TiGA and compare
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with individually rational levels allowed by equilibria in repeated games; (d) Considering a constraint on
the average transmit power and a finite energy constraint would also be a very practical feature to be
included. The energy constraint should change the transmitters’ behaviors, which is a priori not that easy
to be predicted.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF THE OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The SINR of user 1 at time τ is given by
SINR1(τ) = γ1(τ) =
|h11|
2p1
σ21 + |h21|
2p2
. (12)
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At time τ+1 one new transmitter arrives, transmitter 1 observes its new SINR but is only able to react at time
τ+2. We precisely want that at least at time τ+1, while transmitter 1 is “surprised”, its communication is not
broken that is, its SINR does not go below a certain threshold, say γ−. At time τ +1 the SINR of user 1 is:
SINR1(τ + 1) = γ1(τ + 1) =
|h11|
2p1
σ21 + |h21|
2p2 + |h31|
2p3(τ + 1)
. (13)
The probability that SINR of player 1 falls, at time τ +1, below γ− given that it was equal to γmin at time τ
expresses by
Pr
[
SINR1(τ + 1) ≤ γ−
∣∣∣SINR1(τ) = γmin] (14)
= Pr
[
|h11|
2p1
σ21 + |h21|
2p2 + |h31|
2Pwu
≤ γ−
∣∣∣γ1(τ) = γmin
]
(15)
= Pr

γ1(τ) 1
1 + |h31|
2Pwu
σ21+|h21|
2p2
≤ γ−
∣∣∣γ1(τ) = γmin

 (16)
= Pr

γmin 1
1 + |h31|
2Pwu
σ21+|h21|
2p2
≤ γ−

 (17)
= Pr
[
|h31|
2 ≥ α
(
γmin
γ−
− 1
)]
(18)
where α = σ
2
1+|h21|
2p2
Pwu
. Here we implicitly assumed that randomness comes from the channel gain between
transmitter 3 and the corresponding receiver.
APPENDIX B
TIMED AUTOMATA
Definition B.1: A timed automaton A = (L,X,Σ, E, I,L) has the following components: (i) L is a finite
set of locations, (ii) X is a finite set of clocks, (iii) Σ is a finite set of actions, (iv) E ⊆ L×Σ×G×2X×L
is a finite set of edges, (v) I : L → G assigns an invariant to each location, and (vi) L : L → 2AP is the
labeling function.
The semantics of a timed automaton A is given by a labelled transition system TA. A state of A is a pair
q = (l, ν) such that l ∈ L and ν |= I(l). We let Q denote the set of all states.
We distinguish two kinds of transitions: time-transitions and switch-transitions:
• Given q = (l, ν) and q′ = (l′, ν ′) two states of A, there is a time-transition in A between q and q′ if
there exists τ ∈ R+ such that l = l′, ν ′ = ν + τ and ν + τ ′ |= I(l) for any τ ′, 0 ≤ τ ′ ≤ τ . We denote
this transition by q τ−→ q′.
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• Given q = (l, ν) and q′ = (l′, ν ′) two states of A, there is a switch-transition in A between q and q′ if
there exists e = (l, a, g, Y, l′) ∈ E such that ν |= g and ν ′ is given by
ν ′i =


0 if xi ∈ Y
νi if xi /∈ Y.
We denote this switch-transition by q e−→ q′. To emphasize on the action a, we also use notation q a−→ q′
in this case, we use the notation Action(e) = a.
We now define the (labelled) transition system TA.
Definition B.2: Given a timed automaton A, the (labelled) transition system associated with A is given
by TA =
(
Q,Σ ∪R+,→
)
where the transition relation is given by
→ =
⋃
τ∈R+
τ
−→∪
⋃
e∈E
e
−→.
Let A = (L,X,Σ, E, I,L) be a timed automaton, q1, q2 and q3 be three states of A. If q1
τ
−→ q2, for some
τ ∈ R+, and q2
e
−→ q3, for some e ∈ E, we shortly denote q1
τ ·e
−→ this sequence of two transitions. A finite
or infinite run ρ is sequence of alternating transitions of the form:
ρ = q1
τ1·e1−−→ q2
τ2·e2−−→ · · ·
τk ·ek−−−→ qk+1 · · · .
We denote by RunA (resp. RunfA) the set of runs (resp. finite runs) of A.
APPENDIX C
TIMED GAMES
Definition C.1: Let A = (L,X,Σ, E, I) be a timed automaton. We say that A is a timed game, if the
set of action Σ contains a particular action denoted u.
In this context, the transitions labelled with u are called the uncontrollable transitions. They represent the
set of actions available to the environment. The other ones are called the controlled transitions. We denote
by Σc the set of actions Σ \ {u}.
Before giving the semantics of timed games, let us first explain it intuitively.
Let A = (L,X,Σ, E, I) be a timed game. The game is played by two players, Player 1 (the controller)
and Player 2 (the environment). At any state q, Player 1 picks a time τ and an action a ∈ Σc such that there
is a transition q τ ·e−→ q′ with Action(e) = a. Player 2 has two choices:
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• either he can decide to wait for time τ and execute a transition q τ ·e−→ q′ proposed by Player 1,
• or he can wait for time τ ′, 0 ≤ τ ′ ≤ τ , and execute a transition q τ
′·e′
−−→ q′′ with Action(e′) = u.
The game then evolves to a new state (according to the choice of Player 2) and the two players proceed to
play as before.
Notice that, in the definition of a timed game, it is implicitly supposed that Player 1 can always formulate
a choice (τ, a) in any reachable state q of the game.
We will now formalize the semantics through the concept of strategy.
Definition C.2: A (Player 1) strategy is a function
λ : RunfA 7→ R
+ × Σc.
Before defining the notion of a winning strategy, we need to define several other notions. We say that a
run ρ is maximal if it is either infinite or ending in a deadlock. An objective Ω of a timed game is a subset
of the runs of A. Let ρ be a run of the form q1
τ1·e1−−→ q2
τ2·e2−−→ · · ·
τk·ek−−−→ qk+1 · · · , we denote by ρi the prefix
of ρ ending in qi. Given a strategy λ and a run ρ, we say that ρ is played according to λ if for every i,
if λ(ρi) = (τ ′i , ai), then either τi = τ ′i and Action(ei) = ai, or τi ≤ τ ′i and Action(ei) = u. We denote by
Outcome(ρ, λ) the set of maximal runs extending ρ and played according to λ. Given a state q, a strategy λ
and an objective Ω, we say that the strategy λ is winning for the objective Ω from q if Outcome(q, λ) ⊆ Ω.
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